Abstract-I examine how foreign presence affects the growth and survival of domestic firms. Separating a negative crowding out and positive technology spillovers, I analyze whether the crowding out effect is dynamic, that is, domestic firms cut production over time as foreign firms grow, or a static effect realized on foreign entry into the industry. Using 1994-2001 firmlevel Czech data, I find evidence of both technology spillovers and crowding out. However, crowding out is only short term; after initial entry shakeout, growing foreign sales increase domestic firm growth and survival, indicating domestic demand creation effect. However, I find no such benefits from domestic competition.
I. Introduction
W ITH increasing globalization, opening up of economies, and deregulation of markets, the role of FDI in the world economy has increased rapidly. MNCs became key drivers of the world GDP, and the total FDI stock raised from 8% to 26% of world GDP between 1990 (OECD, 2008 . Since the mid-1990s, FDI has become the main source of external finance for developing countries and is more than twice as large as official development aid. FDI has been playing an important role as well in the transitional countries of central and eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic, where domestic mass privatization failed in the restructuring process of the formerly state-owned enterprises (Kočenda & Svejnar, 2003) . The expansion of FDI, as a major source of financial capital and new technologies especially in emerging markets, raised expectations about its potential contributions to the economic growth and development. Hence, many countries not only liberalized their markets, but started to offer generous investment packages, such as tax holidays, import duty exemptions, or preferential loans (UNCTAD, 2003) to attract FDI. However, the evidence of the impact of FDI on host economies is mixed. This issue is important not only to academics and policymakers, but also to managers of MNCs, because it a affects their reputation and bargaining position in the host countries (Meyer, 2004) .
Theory on technology diffusion advocates that FDI will promote growth as MNCs confer technology spillovers to domestic firms. 1 This view, supported by early case studies and industry-level findings (Caves, 1974; Blomström, 1986) , emphasizes that activities of MNCs should generate knowledge externalities, that is, facilitate the transfer of more efficient technology and management practices from foreign to domestic firms. Macroeconomic studies (Borensztein, Gregorio & Lee 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004) provide supporting evidence, but only under some conditions, and Carkovic and Levine (2005) find no evidence of a positive impact of FDI on economic growth. Firm-level panel studies, for example, Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) , have found negative or no spillover effects. Studies in transitional economies show similar results: negative FDI spillovers were found in the Czech Republic (Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Kinoshita, 2000; Sabirianova et al., 2005) , Bulgaria, and Romania, but no spillovers were found in Poland (Konings, 2001) . Using data for seventeen emerging markets, Gorodnichenko Svejnar, and Terrell (2007) suggest that the presence of spillovers may depend on various firm, industry, and institutional characteristics. Aitken and Harrison (1999) explain these contradictory findings as "market stealing" or the crowding-out effect. They argue that even though technology spillovers exist, more efficient foreign firms may draw demand from domestic firms, so the negative competitive effect may outweigh positive technology spillovers. Caves (1996) and Blomström, Kokko, and Zejen (2000) also argue that the likelihood that MNCs will crowd out local firms is larger in developing than in developed countries because of a higher technology gap between domestic and foreign firms. 2 From a policy perspective, these results and arguments raise concern as to whether FDI incentives are justified, especially in developing or transitional countries. Another concern is that the fear of being crowded out and a popular belief that MNCs will monopolize domestic markets complicates the restructuralization process in many transitional countries. 3 Indeed, the protectionist backlash against FDI has recently arisen not only in emerging markets, such as Russia and Latin America, but in developed countries, including the United States and Europe (Economist, 2008; UNCTAD, 2006) . However, if crowding out is just a shortrun effect and positive spillovers dominate in the long run, as suggested by Aitken and Harrison, these actions may impede growth in many transitional and developing countries. To provide new evidence on these issues, I use data for a transitional country, the Czech Republic, and ask the following questions: Is there evidence of a crowding-out effect in a transitional country? Are there technology spillovers? What is the mechanism of crowding out? -Is it a dynamic effect, where domestic firms continue to cut production over time as foreign firms grow in the domestic industry, or is it a short-term static effect realized on foreign entry into the industry? In the end, is the impact of foreign competition really different from that of domestic competition?
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While previous firm-level studies analyzed the impact of FDI on domestic firm productivity, I address these questions by analyzing the impact of foreign presence on the growth and survival of domestic firms. Firm growth and exit are the underpinnings of job creation and destruction. Knowing how FDI affects these variables will help us not only better assess the impact of FDI on domestic firm performance but better understand the impact on the entire economy.
I use theoretical and empirical methodology that overcomes several shortcomings in the literature. First, I separate the crowding out from the technology spillover effect. Previous studies usually used only one measure for FDI presence and as such can provide only the short-run net FDI impact, that is, whether the positive technology transfer outweighs the negative competitive effect within the same time period. However, if the estimated effect is zero, as it is in several studies, we do not know whether spillover and competitive effects exist at all or whether they are just perfectly balanced. Moreover, if these effects have different timing, mixing them into one measure may bias the overall picture. From a theoretical and a policy perspective, it is important to separate these effects to better understand how domestic firms adjust to FDI and how institutions or market forces could affect the size of each effect. Second, I incorporate firm exit into the analyses. Most research on FDI spillovers has neglected the possibility that domestic firms may exit as a result of foreign competition. Then the positive evidence on FDI spillovers might be overestimated. Interestingly, the impact of FDI on domestic firm survival has not received much attention in the literature. Görg and Strobl (2000) and De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) are to my knowledge the only studies that analyze the impact of FDI on domestic firm survival, but they do so for developed countries. Third, my framework allows analyzing the FDI impact on firm performance without input measurement. So one can avoid the input endogeneity problems in productivity estimations. 4 Theoretically, I rely on a model that combines a dominant firm and competitive fringe framework with a Jovanovic-type model of firm and industry dynamics (Jovanovic, 1982; Sun, 2002) . The model gives predictions for the growth and exit of domestic firms, which I test using a unique 1994-2001 panel data set on foreign and domestic firms in the Czech Republic. I focus on this country for several reasons. First, a single country helps to avoid the empirical difficulties with controlling for cross-country differences that affect FDI inflows. Second, as table 1 shows, the Czech Republic is one of the countries with the highest FDI inflows in central and eastern Europe, so there should be a sufficient foreign presence to address my questions. Third, unlike other transitional countries with high FDI inflows, such as Hungary or Poland, the Czech Republic was virtually closed until transition started in 1989, so it provides almost a natural experiment environment for my study. Finally, being a model for countries that started transition later, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Soviet Union, the results might be generalizable to other countries. Compared to many other studies, my data provide an extensive coverage of firms of different sizes, including small firms and single entrepreneurs, whose presence is important to fully capture the FDI impact. Moreover, firm-level data for eight years of transition, almost double time the period of most previous studies, allow me to control for all kinds of fixed effects as well as firm self-selection and thus avoid potential endogeneity problems with FDI inflows.
My results show evidence of both technology spillover and crowding-out effects. However, crowding out appears to be a short-term or static phenomenon. Initial foreign entry increases the exit rate of domestic firms; subsequently, however, the sales growth of the foreign firms in the industry increases both the growth rate and the survival of domestic firms. Dividing industries between low-and high-export oriented suggests that this positive foreign growth effect represents domestic demand creation, not export spillovers. My estimates also suggest that the positive externalities due to demand creation and technology spillovers offset the static crowding-out effect within two years. These results are robust across different specifications. Including measures for the entry and growth of other domestic firms, together with subsample analyses according to the level of FDI presence, further confirms my findings and provides compelling evidence that the impact of foreign firms is indeed different from that of domestic firms. Although, while there are long-run benefits from foreign competition, there are no such benefits from other domestic firms. Further analyses also show that domestic firms in the technologically advanced industries are the primary beneficiaries of technology spillovers.
My paper brings several contributions to the literature. First, it extends the literature on FDI, economic growth, and development. Second, it links FDI literature with studies on firm and industry dynamics. Only recently have these studies started to consider the impact of trade liberalization on firm sizes and industry evolution. 5 My results show that FDI liberalization can also initiate industry shakeout and affect domestic firm sizes. Third, it relates to the literature on product market regulation. Schiantarelli (2005) points out that "there is little evidence on the effect of regulatory changes on firm outcomes in developing countries." My paper shows how removing FDI entry barriers in a small, closed economy affects domestic firm performance. It also indicates that regulation should not discriminate against MNCs since foreign competition in emerging markets can generate much larger long-run benefits than domestic competition can.
As on anecdotal example, I discuss the case of the Czech auto industry, one of the most successful industries in attracting FDI. By 2000 one-third of the top 100 European auto parts firms operated in the industry, with a total foreign market share of 81%. 6 In 2005 cars represented 20% of the Czech industrial output and employed more than 130,000 people. As BusinessWeek noted, "The auto-driven boom is also changing the landscape. Roads are being paved and widened, new hyperstores are being built and factories are mushrooming" ("Detroit East," 2005) . This boom started in 1991 when German Volkswagen privatized a major state-owned car company, Škoda. The success of new Škoda cars, the central location of the Czech Republic, with an easy access to all European markets, cheap and high-skilled labor, and generous FDI incentives attracted other MNCs, mostly into the auto parts segments; among them are Ford (car lighting systems), Robert Bosch (diesel engine components), Daewoo (engines), and Hayes Lemmerz (wheel assembly). In 2005 another big car company, a Toyota-PSA Peugeot Citroën, joint plant, entered the industry. Today the Czech Republic is called the "Hub of Detroit East." 7 Foreign production also boosted domestic auto parts producers that had suffered huge output declines in the early 1990s due to market liberalization. In particular, Škoda's training program helped many of them, including Gumotex (rubber parts and seat upholstery), Karsit (seat parts), and Brisk Tábor (spark plugs), to increase quality and expand sales to other car producers. 8 However, not all domestic firms were so lucky. Military-based Vojenský Opravárenský Podnik 081 Přelouč (production and repairs of trucks and special heavy machinery) ended operations in 1994 and was liquidated. Another big firm, Tatra, which during socialism also produced popular luxury cars, closed such production as a result of foreign competition. Since 1998 Tatra has focused only on truck production, which also suffered from a major decline-almost 90% in 1994-and several plants went into bankruptcy. Similarly, Avia Karoseria Brno (production of parts and accessories for commercial vehicles and trucks), struggled for survival in 1997-1998, but it found its market niche and started to grow.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical model. Section III discusses the technology spillovers. Sections IV and V describe data and variable measurement. Section VI describes the empirical methodology. The remaining sections discuss my findings and conclude. Aitken and Harrison (1999) argue that though technology spillovers may exist, MNCs can draw demand from less efficient domestic firms and force them to cut production. They 6 http://www.factbook.net/countryreports/cz/Cz_AutoParts_mkt.htm. 7 "Detroit East" (2005) . 8 See Pavlínek (2003) and http://www.factbook.net/countryreports/cz/Cz_ AutoParts_mkt.htm. As part of the training, Škoda held workshops to educate domestic firms about quality standards and how to achieve them.
II. Theoretical Model
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refer to this competitive or crowding-out effect as market stealing. However, this effect may also induce firm exit, so I consider both outcomes as evidence of crowding out. Moreover, this effect can be just a one-time phenomenon, realized at the time of foreign entry, or it can arise over time as MNCs expand their production. I refer to the first one as static and to the latter as dynamic crowding-out effect. Analyzing how crowding out works helps us understand whether the adjustment to FDI inflows is a shock therapy or a gradual process. If crowding out is a dynamic effect, given the demand, foreign sales growth should reduce the sales of domestic firms over time and thus reduce their growth rates and threaten their survival. If it is a static effect, then only foreign entry should have a negative effect on domestic firm growth rates and survival. Afterward, the demand of both domestic and foreign firms should be driven only by common shifts in aggregate demand.
A. Dominant Firm-Competitive Fringe Structure and Theory on MNCs
I assume that a domestic market with foreign firms resembles a dominant firm-competitive fringe (DF/CF) industry structure. For simplicity, foreign firms as a group are represented by a single dominant firm (DF), and domestic firms form the competitive fringe (CF, henceforth, "fringe"). 9 In the standard DF/CF model, a dominant firm has a higher market share than a single firm on the fringe (though collectively, fringe firms may have a substantial market share), thanks to better management or technology, early entry into the market and learning by doing, economies of scale, or a favorable public policy, such as subsidies. Thanks to these cost advantages, a dominant firm behaves like a market leader and sets the market prices that fringe firms take as given. 10 The assumptions about dominant firm are quite consistent with the characteristics of MNCs found in the empirical studies 11 and the ownership advantages emphasized by Dunning's (1988) theory on MNCs. 12 Hymer (1960) also argued that scale economies, knowledge, and credit advantages of MNCs help them to increase their market power. One can expect that in transitional countries such as the Czech Republic, where domestic firms operated for years without market competition, prices and quantities were centrally determined and firms often received subsidies without any incentives to 9 However, the main implications of the model would hold even under other forms of imperfect competition or if MNCs behaved competitively. The key point is that more efficient foreign firms reduce the market price and thus decrease output (or induce exit) of domestic firms. So even without a dominant firm assumption, the main result in equation (6) would hold.
10 See Carlton and Perloff (2000) for more details on the DF/CF model. 11 MNCs usually have high levels of R&D, intangible assets, patents, and new or technically complex products (Markusen, 1995) . Morck and Yeung (1991) also find that firm age is highly correlated with multinationality.
12 According to Dunning's ownership advantages, MNCs must possess product, process, or technology that local firms cannot gain access to, due to protection by a patent or trademark, for example, and that confers sufficient market power or a cost advantage that outweighs the uncertainty from doing business abroad. Figure 1 shows the static crowding-out effect due to foreign entry. Figure 1a shows the market demand D(p), total fringe supply S(p), and the shut-down price p of the fringe firms. Figure 1b introduces the dominant firm, where the residual demand of the dominant firm is a horizontal distance between D(p) and S(p). The dominant firm behaves as a market leader and chooses output Q DF s.t. MR = MC DF , which sets the market price and thus the quantity that the fringe can sell on the market, Q CF . As a result, some domestic firms produce less and some exit. The extent of crowding out depends on the difference between the marginal costs of the dominant and the fringe firms. If the marginal cost of a dominant firm is very low, say MC DF 2 , the new market price is below p, and all domestic firms exit. If the dominant firm's marginal cost is higher, say MC DF 1 , the equilibrium price is p * , and the domestic firms with shut-down prices below p * survive but produce less.
B. Static Crowding Out
C. Dynamic Crowding-Out Effect
To analyze the impact of foreign presence on domestic firms over time, I incorporate the DF/CF industry structure into a model of firm and industry dynamics (Jovanovic, 1982; Sun, 2002) . I assume that domestic firms (i.e., fringe) follow Jovanovic's setup: they are heterogeneous firms that operate in a competitive industry with incomplete information about their cost efficiency and learn about it only while operating 13 In the Czech Republic the incentives for foreign investors include up to ten years' tax holidays, duty-free imports, and financial support by government for training and job creation (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003) .
14 For example, in the Czech chemical industry, the International Center for Economic Growth report (2003) notes, "concentration is being controlled by a closed number of great MNCs.…The need of capital can arise some problems for small and medium sized enterprises due to their less economic power, insufficient legal, economic, technical and management capacities." in the industry. As a result, efficient firms grow and survive, while inefficient firms decline and exit. The exit-generating mechanism is missing in productivity-based studies of FDI spillovers. 15 Adding Sun's technology shocks allows us to incorporate technology spillovers. The model is solved backward. First, given the prices, the fringe firms choose output and decide whether to stay or exit. Second, given the total fringe supply, the dominant firm chooses the equilibrium prices that (for simplicity) are perfectly forecastable.
Domestic firms-competitive fringe. Many domestic firms are on the competitive fringe, each too small to affect price. Each period a firm chooses output q t to maximize its expected profit
where
, is a price sequence, C(q t )T t x * t are firm total costs, and C(q t ) is a convex function that satisfies C(0) = 0,
x t is the inverse of firm production efficiency, where x t = f (δ t ), δ t = θ+ε t , and x e t is an expectation of x t conditional on information at time t. The function f is positive, strictly increasing, and continuous with lim δ t →−∞ A 1 > 0 and lim δ t →∞ A 2 ≤ ∞. Parameter θ is the firm's true cost efficiency (or firm type) normally distributed with meanθ and variance σ 2 θ . A firm does not know its θ but learns about it while operating in the industry by Bayesian updating through productivity shocks, ε t ∼ N(0, σ 2 ε ), independent across firms and time. 16 A firm learns its productivity shock at the end of a period from realized profits and updates its expectation for the next period, x e t+1 . 17 Like Sun (2002) , I assume that besides productivity shocks, a firm also receives technology shocks, u t ∼ N(ū, σ 2 u ) independent and identically distributed that cumulate over time, so T t = t j=t−n (1 − u j ) represents a firm's technology level and reflects all the shocks a firm received up to time t (n represents firm age). u t > 0 represents a plausible (marginal costs decreasing) shock, bounded from above by 1 to prevent negative costs, andū is the technological trend. I assume that on entry, a firm does not have any technology improvements yet, so T 0 = 1. u t can represent any shock that has a persistent effect on firm costs: innovation, management changes, or 15 Blomström et al. (2000) also argue that competition between MNCs and domestic firms should be analyzed from the perspective of industry dynamics, not total factor productivity. 16 Upon entry, all entrants have the same prior beliefs about their efficiency, x 0 = E 0 (f (θ + ε t )). Each entrant considers itself to be a random draw from N(θ, σ 2 θ ). This prior distribution is updated as a firm gets productivity shocks and infers δ t . At any time t, firm expectations are formed as x e t = E(x | δ n , n) = f (δ)dP(δ |δ n , n), where P(δ |δ n , n) is the normal posterior distribution of δ conditional on the information at time t, n is firm age and Jovanovic, 1982 ). So if the firm's optimal growth rate would be less than g t+1 , a firm exits, q * t+1 = 0, and the observed growth rate is −1. So the same variables that affect firm growth should also affect firm exit. Firm exit should decrease with prices (with a convex cost function, a firm can produce more and grow at higher prices), positive technology shock, and expectations of higher efficiency, so larger and older firms should have lower exit rates. Jovanovic (1982) , I assume that every period, there is a deterministic downward-sloping market demand, Q m t (p t ), so all the demand changes are foreseen and prices are perfectly forecastable. In equilibrium, the residual demand of the dominant firm, Q DF t (p), can be written as the total market demand, Q m t (p t ), minus the total supply of competitive fringe, Q CF t (p):
Dominant firm behavior and equilibrium. As in
Although fringe firms face individual uncertainty, there is no aggregate uncertainty, so Q CF t (p) is deterministic in each period. 18 Given Q CF t (p), the equilibrium price sequence,
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, must maximize the dominant firm's net present value of profits:
represents the total cost of the dominant firm, c(.) is a convex cost function, f is the same function as in case of fringe firms, and δ is the discount factor. I assume that the dominant firm knows its true efficiency, θ DF , so f (θ DF ) is deterministic. This follows the earlier discussion that while domestic firms operate in the competitive environment only after the transition has started, MNCs have already operated in the competitive markets for a long time and could learn their true efficiency. I also assume that at each output level c (q) < C (q) and f (θ DF ) < x 0 , since the dominant firm has better technology (recall that C(q) and x 0 are the cost function and the prior expectation of the fringe firms). Without uncertainty about production efficiency and perfectly forecastable prices, the optimization problem of the dominant firm simplifies into time-separable one-period optimization problems, so each period a price p t solves
This
Substitution into the last result and expanding by p t gives dp t
where (6) is a standard price cost margin or Lerner index:
Rewriting it in discrete time gives
where m t is the dominant firm price markup. Substitution into equation (2) gives the domestic firm growth rate as
So given the markup, the larger the growth rate is in the output of dominant firm, the lower the prices and thus the smaller growth rates of domestic firms. Also, the industry-trend cross product is added to account for changes in demand, Q m t (p t ), over time. Due to the convex costs function of domestic firms, higher foreign growth rates should also increase domestic firm exit. Empirically, the growth rate in the output of the dominant firm captures a dynamic crowding-out effect, and the term −km t represents the output elasticity of domestic firm, q * t , with respect to the foreign output, Q DF t .
III. Technology Spillovers and Technology Shock u t+1
While the competitive/crowding-out effect enters the model by foreign output changes, the technology spillovers enter by technology shock u t+1 in the costs of domestic firm. Since spillovers or externalities are by definition unintended, u t+1 is not a choice variable of the dominant or domestic firm. 19 So I proxy u t+1 as a function of firm and industry characteristics discussed in the technology transfer and the FDI spillovers literature (the next section explains the variable measurement).
Technology can be transferred from foreign to domestic firms through different channels, such as business contracts, training domestic workers, employing workers who used to work for an MNC, or a demonstration effect as domestic firms observe and learn from the successes and failures of MNCs. 20 Regardless of the channel, though, the larger the foreign presence is, the more opportunities there are for spillovers (Keller, 2004) . Wang and Blomström (1992) also argue that spillovers are proportional to the extent of foreign presence in the industry. I proxy intraindustry technology spillovers by foreign employment share (FORempl.sh), where the higher share should bring larger technology shocks. Sinani and Meyer (2004) use different measures of foreign presenceemployment share, market share, and foreign equity share in the industry-and find the strongest impact from foreign employment share. Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007) point to the two advantages of this measure: it shows how prevalent MNCs are relative to the overall size of the industry, and it reflects the interpersonal contact emphasized by the spillover theories (Findlay, 1978) . Intuitively, the more people who work in MNCs, the more people who can demonstrate or discuss what MNCs do and how, train other domestic workers, start own business, or come to work for a domestic firm. Thus, my measure of technology spillovers captures all of these and other channels that involve some interpersonal contact between a domestic firm and MNC employees. Based on Czech enterprise surveys, Deardorff and Djankov (2000) document the technology transfer by subcontracting. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2004) also note that most Czech firms learn from MNCs through employee training (often free of charge) or getting help with such business practices as quality control, organization of production lines, or inventory. 21 The case of the Czech auto industry is direct evidence of this. In addition, I also consider intrafirm technology spillovers 19 The technology spillovers enter the optimization problem of dominant firm only indirectly through total fringe supply.
20 See Blomström et al. (2000, chap. 8 ) for a discussion. 21 Unfortunately I have no data to separate these individual channels.
as domestic firms that have some foreign shareholders (FORdirect) can gain easier access to foreign technology or crucial resources by direct ownership ties (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999; Meyer, 2004) . Several studies (including Audretsch, 1991) have shown that firm innovation increases growth and survival. It also determines a firm's absorptive capacity-its ability to recognize valuable knowledge, integrate it, and use it productively (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) . The FDI literature suggests that in order to benefit from technology spillovers, local firms need a certain level of technological (in-house) expertise. So to control for firm absorptive capacity, I use firm's intangible asset ratio (intang). Firms with a higher proportion of intangibles should be able to adopt or imitate new technologies more easily and benefit thus from a larger technology shock u t+1 . The literature also suggests that the extent of technology spillovers may depend on the technology gap (henceforth, gap)-the difference in the technological capabilities between domestic and foreign firms. 22 The technology transfer literature argues that a larger gap raises the transfer costs and reduces the chances the transfer will happen. However, in Findlay's (1978) model, a larger technology gap increases the room for spillovers. So I include the technology gap and its interaction with foreign employment share into the u t+1 function to allow the possibility that the technology gap stimulates or inhibits intraindustry technology spillovers.
Since in my model u t+1 is firm specific, I allow in the estimations firm effects μ i . Also, given it is observed only at the beginning of t + 1, I measure all the above variables at time t. Assuming linear functional form, the technological shock of a domestic firm i in industry j can then be written as:
IV. Data Description
I use 1994-2001 firm-level panel data for the Czech Republic from the Amadeus database, which covers firms in western, central, and eastern Europe and Russia. It includes firm registration (firm ID, date of incorporation, city, region, and other firm characteristics), balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, various industry classifications, and firm ownership information. The Czech data are based on firm accounts filed with the tax office or business register. Since all registered firms have to file, firms of all sizes are included, and there is also a large number of entrepreneurs. So the database gives a good representation of the economy. 23 Also, to 22 For example, Findlay (1978) , Sjöholm (1999) , and Haddad and Harrison (1993) . 23 Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2005) discuss data collection by Amadeus and conclude that country-wise, the database represents the entire economies quite well. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2004) also point to its large coverage compared to other data sources. maximize firm coverage in my sample (Amadeus dropped some small firms later on), I combine data across several Amadeus versions obtained at different dates: a DVD version for 1993-1998 and online downloads in March 2002 and January and February 2003. 24 This also helped to increase data on firm ownership (see note 26).
In my analyses, I use three-digit primary USSIC industry codes. The Czech Republic is a small country (population around 10 million), so there are very few firms with higher-digit codes. My initial sample contained 11,545 firms. Excluding agriculture, government, legal, education, religion, health services, and other nonprofit entities, mostly government owned, left 10,335 firms. Dropping data miscodings left 10,157 firms. Balance sheet cleaning, missing data filing, and outlier exclusions gave a sample of 9,986 firms (details provided on request). Among these, 5,235 firms are classified as domestic, 1,398 as foreign and 3,353 as nonclassified. Comparing classified and nonclassified firms showed that nonclassified firms operate at zero profit margin and are significantly smaller in market share, total assets, sales, and other measures of size, so I consider them to be small Czech start-ups and thus domestic firms.
The model assumes that domestic firms behave competitively, so I restrict my analyses to 141 competitive industries (at least ten domestic firms per industry before data cleaning). Among these, 11 industries are without foreign presence, so including them makes the analyses more representative for the entire economy. Tables 9 and 10 list all the industries divided into high-and low-export oriented. The final samples I use to estimate the growth and exit equation contain 5,705 (20,462 observations) and 6,291 (24,733 observations) domestic firms, respectively, and 1,304 foreign firms (unbalanced). 25 I classify a firm as foreign if its ultimate owner (a firm at the top of the ownership chain) is not Czech (see Appendix). I prefer ultimate ownership to the sum (or total) of foreign direct ownerships used in previous studies, since the sum does not reflect who has ultimate control or a final word on a firm (see also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) . 26 Table 2 compares the performance of domestic and foreign firms and confirms that the key assumptions of the DF/CF 868 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. Domestic firms include both classified firms (known ultimate owner) and nonclassified firms (firms with unknown ultimate owner treated as domestic). A comparison between foreign and classified domestic firms gave the same results. The comparisons do not change when eleven industries without foreign presence are excluded. The following variables are defined as follows: value added = taxation + profit (loss) per year + costs of employees + depreciation + interest paid; liquidity ratio = (current assets − stocks)/current liabilities; return on assets = profit (loss) before taxation/total assets; solvency ratio = shareholders' funds (capital + other shareholders' funds and retained profit)/total assets; profit margin = [(operating revenues − costs of good sold − other expenditures) + (financial revenues − financial expenditures)]/operating revenues. model hold in my data: on average, foreign firms have significantly larger market shares; higher value-added, growth rates and K/L ratios; more intangible assets; and better financial performance in terms of return on assets and cash flow than domestic firms do. Moreover, while domestic firms operate on zero profit margin, foreign firms show positive profits.
V. Variable Definitions and Empirical Specifications
Substituting equation (8) into equation (7) and including other controls that I explain below gives the empirical equation for the domestic firm growth rate (i indexes a domestic firm, j an industry, and t year). The same variables also enter domestic firm exit and survival analyses: 27 All foreign-level variables are computed before data cleaning to obtain a precise representation of the industry. Also, when foreign entry occurs during my sample period, the growth rate in the entry year would be infinite, so in that year, I set FORgrowth = 2, as per the alternative formula (y t+1 − y t )/(y t+1 + y t )/2.
28 There were two privatization waves in the Czech Republic: 1991-1992 (small scale) and 1991-early 1995 (large scale). By 1995, the major privatization process was completed, and stable ownership shares were determined (Kočenda & Svejnar, 2003) . 29 The nonlinear terms also control for possible heteroskedasticity of growth rates due to firm age and size. . The numerator is the sum of shareholders' capital and other funds, including retained profits. Finance studies suggest that growth, especially of small firms, depends on the availability of internal finance or retained profits. 33 I have no data on retained profits, so I use a solvency ratio to control for firm internal finance. 34 It should have a positive impact on firm growth only if firms are financially constrained. Otherwise it should have no effect. I also expect a positive effect on firm survival, since larger internal funds can prevent firm exit. pre-1989 i : Dummy = 1 if the firm was founded before 1989. These are former state-owned enterprises, often subsidized and facing soft budget constraints even after 1989 (Lízal & Svejnar, 2002) . I expect a positive effect on firm survival, since the subsidies were given to prevent firm exit and unemployment, but no or negative effect on firm growth. These firms are often less profitable and in Jovanovic's setup, smaller profits lead to smaller growth rates. 35 30 I scale intangible assets by total assets since larger firms also usually have larger intangible assets. 31 In industries without foreign presence, the variables FORgrowth, FORempl.sh, and gap are set equal to 0.
32 This cross-effect implicitly controls also for the cross-effect FORempl.sh × intang. So there is a high correlation (0.934) between the two cross-effects. When I included FORempl.sh×intang instead, the results did not change.
33 See Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Lízal and Svejnar (2002) for evidence among the Czech firms. 34 The solvency ratio is basically the inverse measure of debt-to-assets ratio, often used to measure financial constraints. When I used an alternative measure, cash flow to assets, the results were similar, but Kaplan and Zingales (1997) question whether this is a reliable measure of firm financial constraints. 35 In my data, firms founded before 1989 are larger in total assets, employees, or K/L ratio, but they are less profitable than firms founded after 1989 and show on average negative growth rates. d t , d j , and d r : Year, industry, and eight regional dummies, respectively. Year dummies control for the business cycles, inflation, aggregate demand, or institutional reforms adopted in certain years. Industry and region dummies control for industry and region fixed effects, including regulation, industry structure, specific input requirements, and location. Including these dummies helps to avoid bias due to the potential endogeneity of FDI inflows. MNCs may target more profitable industries or regions with larger FDI incentives, or enter in a certain year, after some political or institutional changes. d j × trend: Industry-specific time trends to control for time-varying industry effects (such as changes in the industry structure) and changes in the industry demand. Keller (2004) discusses the importance of industry-trend effects in the FDI spillover studies to avoid endogeneity issues.
Also, in the growth equation, I include four exit-type dummies (liquidation, bankruptcy, both, and out of the register) to control for possible differences in the growth rates due to different types of exit.
I define domestic firm exit as the year when a firm enters a liquidation or bankruptcy process, whichever started earlier. 36 Also, I allow for a two-year prior exit window to incorporate the reporting delays or mismatch between calendar and fiscal years. For example, if a firm started a liquidation process in 1999 but the last reported sales are in 1997, I assume that a firm exits in 1997. Then Exit ijt = 1 in the year when a firm exits and 0 in all prior years. Firms that survive until 2001 have Exit ijt = 0. There were 554 exits across 141 industries in my data, but due to missing covariates, 273 exits remain in my final sample. Table 3 shows summary statistics for all the variables.
VI. Empirical Methodology
A. Estimation of Firm Growth
For robustness, I estimate the growth equation by several methods. First, I use fixed and random effects that control 36 I rely on the start (rather than the end) of these processes, since when a firm enters any such process, it no longer freely operates in the market; all firm decisions are transferred to an outside person supervised by a court. I collected these dates from the Czech Business Register. I took as the pool of potential exiters 3,399 firms (before data cleaning) that filed the last balance sheet to Amadeus in 1999 or earlier and verified their status-active, in liquidation or bankruptcy, in both processes, or out of the register-in the Business Register. (Random checking showed that missing balance sheets in 2000-2001 are mostly due to delayed filings.) If a firm was out of the register, it must have already been liquidated and its record deleted from the register. So I assign firm exit in the year in which it reports the last sales or the last balance sheet if sales are missing. At the end, I added to the list of exiters 100 firms that filed the last balance sheet after 1999, but their name included the phrase v likvidaci (in liquidation). By law, a firm must add this phrase to its name when starting the liquidation process. I have no data on mergers or acquisitions. These, however, do not represent proper exits, because though firms change the ownership, they continue producing. In the growth sample, there are 3,982 classified (dummy NCL = 0, 15,173 observations) and 1,723 nonclassified (NCL = 1, 5,289 observations) domestic firms, for a total of 5,705 domestic firms. Similarly in the exit sample, there are 4,278 classified (NCL = 0, 18,114 observations) and 2,013 nonclassified (NCL = 1, 6,619 observations) domestic firms.
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a If not the same in both samples, then the statistics are reported first for growth sample and (after the slash) for exit sample.
for firm unobserved heterogeneity. 37 Then I estimate a Tobit model to control for data censoring. Though linear models provide inconsistent estimates when the dependent variable is censored, they provide a useful benchmark for the marginal effects near the population means (Wooldridge, 2002) . A random effects model assumes that firm unobserved heterogeneity μ i is part of the error, so the estimates are inconsistent if μ i is correlated with the regressors. In such a case, a fixed effects estimator is appropriate. I verify such correlation by a Hausman test. Although exit observations (Growth ijt+1 = −1) are included in the linear models, they ignore that the dependent variable is censored at −1. To control for censoring, I estimate both pooled and random effects tobit. At the end, I also use GEE (generalized estimating equations). While a random effects model provides efficient estimates under the assumptions of homoskedasticity and equal correlation structure, the GEE method corrects for heteroskedasticity and is robust to 37 OLS with robust standard errors corrected for firm clusters produced results similar to the random effects model. any misspecification in the correlation structure (Liang & Zeger, 1986) .
Controlling for firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (self-selection).
A Hausman test rejected the random effects model; moreover, the sales and solvency coefficients were very different in fixed effects and other models, pointing to the endogeneity problem due to firm unobserved heterogeneity. Since tobit and survival models are nonlinear, μ i cannot be differenced out as in the fixed effects model. Wooldridge (1995 Wooldridge ( , 2002 suggests using Mundlak's (1978) idea of modeling firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity as a function of a firm-level means of firm variables, X i , such that μ i = X i ξ + a i , where a i is the part of firm heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with X i and X ijt . The means exclude all the dummies, industry-trend effects, and other variables that do not vary across firms or time (Wooldridge, 2002) . However, since foreign firms may affect firm unobserved heterogeneity by spillovers, I include the means of foreign employment share and foreign growth rate. Adding X i as controls, I estimate firm growth by random effects, GEE, and pooled and random effects tobit.
B. Estimation of Firm Exit and Survival
Several data issues affected my estimations. In my sample, there are 273 exits, but other observations are right censored. The data are also left truncated, that is, there are firms that operated for years (and thus occurred under the risk of exit) before entering my sample. Using ageT as a measure of firm survival, if a firm enters my sample at, say, ageT = 6, it is only because it did not exit before I observe it, so there is a survivorship bias. I control for both survivorship bias and data censoring by conditioning the maximum likelihood function on ageT at which a firm enters the sample and the dummy whether observation is censored or not. Also, due to the "perfect success determination" problem, I had to regroup some year and industry dummies 38 and use industry sales growth rate between t + 1 and t instead of industry-trend cross effects to control for industry demand.
I analyze firm exit using two approaches. First, I use continuous survival analyses: a parametric log-normal model and, for robustness, a nonparametric Cox model, because firm survival is a continuous variable (a firm can exit after two and a half years). However, since data are grouped by years due to balance sheet reporting, I also estimate firm exit by a discrete method: probit. 39 Though the theoretical model implies decreasing hazard rates, my data showed rather nonmonotonic exit rates, so I use a log-normal model. As in growth, I include firm-level means to model the firm's unobserved correlated heterogeneity. However, now the means exclude ageT (and its polynomials), since it is used to construct the outcome variables. In addition, in all estimations, I adjust the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters. I also tried the industry-year clusters, but the results were similar. 40 Firm survival: Log-normal model. Due to the nonmonotonicity of hazard rates, the log-normal model can be estimated only in accelerated failure time form as ln(T ) = X ijt β + ω ijt . T denotes firm survival measured by ageT ( t indexes a particular value), X ijt is the vector of regressors, and the error term ω ijt follows a normal distribution. I assume that ω ijt = μ i + e ijt , where μ i is firm unobserved heterogeneity and e ijt is idiosyncratic error. The density of firm survival time f ( t), and the probability that a firm survives up to time t, S( t), follow log-normal distribution: 38 There are no exits in the years 1995-1996, so the coefficients of these dummies would be minus infinite. I group years 1994-1995 together and 1996-1997 together. Similarly, I group several industry dummies into bigger categories. 39 Results from the logit model were similar and are not reported. 40 Moulton (1990) explains that when the dependent variable is at a microlevel and the regressor is aggregated, the OLS standard errors might be underestimated. Since similar problem may arise in nonlinear models, I used industry-year clusters as well. However, such clustering assumes that firm observations are uncorrelated over time, which I find much more restrictive, so I rely on firm clusters.
ln( t)−X β)] and S( t) = 1−Φ( ln( t)−X β σ
). The maximum likelihood function I estimate is then
where d i = 1 if an observation is uncensored (0 if censored) and t i entry is ageT at which a firm enters my sample (to correct for left truncation). 41 Exit hazard rates: Cox model. In the Cox model, exit hazard rate h( t), or the rate at which a firm exits given it survived up to time t, can be written in the proportional form: h( t) = h 0 ( t)e X β . Then covariates X predict the shifts in the baseline hazard h 0 ( t). In tables, I report the exponentiated coefficients, e β , as these directly show how covariates affect the exit hazard (Cox) or survival time (log-normal) ratio. 42 Across the two models, the same variables should be significant, but the coefficients should have the opposite signs. Unlike the log-normal model, however, the Cox model does not assume any distribution. Without exit ties (firms exit at different time), the partial likelihood function has the form
. The numerator is the hazard that a firm exits at t i . The denominator is the sum of hazards for all firms in the risk set R( t i ), that is, all firms that could exit at ageT = t i and already entered my sample. Since data are grouped, many firms exit in the same year, so I use the Effron method to handle the exit ties. 43 Discrete regression analysis of hazard rates. I also estimate domestic firm exit by probit model. 44 Controlling for survival time (ageT ), it approximates the exit hazard rates. Since estimates from pooled and random effects probit were almost identical, I report only pooled probit results.
VII. Results
A. Domestic Firm Growth Rates
The results are in table 4, cols. 1 to 5. All specifications but fixed effects include firm-level means to control for firmcorrelated unobserved heterogeneity. Now the Hausman test does not reject the random effects model, and the estimates are very similar across all methods. In tobit, I report the estimated coefficients, since the marginal effects (at means) 41 I also tried the frailty versions of the log-normal model, but in most cases, they did not converge. 42 If we increase variable X k by 1 unit, the hazard ratio is
43 See Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999, p. 107 ) for more details. 44 Since probit estimates are inconsistent under heteroskedasticity, I compared the uncorrected and robust standard errors in pooled probit (see also Evans, 1987) . The errors were similar, so heteroskedasticity should not be a problem. All specifications but fixed effects include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text for details). In the Cox and log-normal models, the exponentiated coefficients and standard errors calculated by the Delta method are reported. Standard errors in parentheses: in GEE, Cox, log-normal, and probit, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters. *Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the industry growth rate is included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details). The Cox model uses the Efron method for ties. For presentation purposes, the coefficients denoted by "b" are divided (multiplied) by 1000 in the log-normal (Cox) model. were very similar. Also, since the random effects tobit and pooled tobit estimates were almost identical and the variance of uncorrelated heterogeneity (a i ) was insignificant, I report only the pooled tobit results.
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Focusing on the variables of interest, foreign growth rate always has a positive and significant impact on domestic firm growth rates, rejecting the dynamic crowding-out effect. To the contrary, the estimate 0.01 shows that increasing foreign growth rate by 1 standard deviation (1.36) raises a domestic firm growth rate on average by 1.4% (or the elasticity of domestic firm sales with respect to foreign sales is 0.01). This is a relevant increase given that the mean growth rate of domestic firms is 9.4%. However, foreign entry has a negative but insignificant impact. No dynamic crowding out is also suggested by figure 2. On average, larger foreign sales do not seem to reduce domestic firm sales. FORempl.sh is always positive but insignificant, as is its cross-effect, FORempl.sh × gap. Hence, technology spillovers might be present, but they are too small to significantly affect domestic firm growth rates. The estimate of FORdirect turns insignificant when controlling for firm unobserved heterogeneity. This rejects the intrafirm technology spillovers and suggests that foreign shareholders probably target firms with higher growth potential. The results remain if I include dummy NoForeign (column 5) for the industry years without foreign firms and the dummy is insignificant.
B. Domestic Firm Survival and Exit
The results are in table 4, columns 6 to 8. In the Cox model, the estimates larger (smaller) than 1 increase (decrease) the exit hazard. The opposite holds in the log-normal model, which shows the impact on firm survival time. Probit estimates support the results in the Cox and log-normal model, The estimate of FORgrowth in the log-normal model shows that a foreign growth rate larger by 1 standard deviation (1.48) raises firm survival by 36%. 45 The Cox model also implies exit rates lower by 42%. These results, similar to the growth analysis, reject dynamic crowding out but show evidence for the static crowding-out effect. FORentry reduces firm survival by around 80% (1-0.214) and increases exit in the Cox and probit models. So there is a shakeout of domestic firms on foreign entry, but domestic firms subsequently benefit from a larger foreign growth. Moreover, FORempl.sh significantly increases firm survival (or reduces exit) and provides evidence for intraindustry technology spillovers. The log-normal model shows that a foreign employment share larger by 1 standard deviation (0.162) raises firm survival by 24%. But there is no evidence of intra-firm technology spillovers; FORdirect is always insignificant.
Given these opposing FDI effects, how soon would the positive externalities offset the negative entry effect? Assessing the long-run net impact on domestic firm survival time, when all three effects are significant-initial FORentry (−80%), FORgrowth between t + 1 and t (+36%), and technology spillovers each period t (+24%)-implies that positive externalities offset the initial foreign entry shock in 2 years. Similarly, when looking on the impact on domestic firm growth rates, FORgrowth increases domestic firm growth rates by 1.4% (while the other two effects are insignificant), so again domestic firms benefit from positive spillovers as soon as in 2 years.
C. Robustness Checks
The results also remain if I drop exit-type dummies in the growth equation, analyze exit using a smaller growth sample or using firm true age instead of ageT (this supports an earlier discussion that firm learning about its efficiency from the model starts with the transition). To verify that my results are not driven by measurement issues, I conduct the additional unreported robustness checks, but the results still hold: (a) split the coefficients of FORgrowth and FORentry across classified and nonclassified domestic firms. The results show that the positive foreign growth effect is driven by the classified (for sure) domestic firms; (b) use shorter time periods when most foreign firms have data on sales balanced; and (c) drop the year 2001 with the most missing sales observations and repeat analyses using FORgrowth constructed only across foreign firms that have complete times series on sales. Finally, I repeat the analyses across subsamples with different levels of firm foreign direct ownership. Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) find positive FDI impact only on the joint ventures. However, I find that domestic firms without foreign shareholders benefit most from foreign growth and technology spillovers, but the static crowding out remains across all firms. To further explore how to explain the positive foreign growth effect, I test alternative hypotheses in the next section.
VIII. How to Explain No Dynamic Crowding-Out Effect?
A. Are Foreign Firms Different, or Do They Pick Up a General Entry or Growth Effect?
Although in all estimations I control for year, industry, and regional dummies to avoid potential endogeneity biases due to aggregate demand shocks or industry or regional differences, and I include three-digit industry-specific time trends (industry growth in survival) to control for time-varying industry changes that may affect both domestic and foreign firms, my controls might not fully capture these effects. Or despite significant differences in size and profits (table 2) , MNCs in my data may not actually be so different in their production efficiency from domestic firms as assumed in the model, so my results may just be picking up a general entry or growth effect, common to foreign and domestic firms. To verify that my results truly show the impact of FDI and that foreign firms have a different impact from other domestic firms, I include in my specification controls for the dynamics in the domestic sector DOMentry − dummy = 1 if other domestic firms (than firm i) enter the industry in year t; and DOMgrowth−growth rate (between t+1 and t) in the domestic part of the industry captured by the sales of other domestic firms (than firm i) in the same three-digit industry. 46 Due to missing sales among several domestic firms, however, I could 46 A domestic firm is an entrant if it is one year (or less) old. Also note that since domestic firms were "always" present in the industry, DOMentry measures the impact from any new inflow of domestic firms into the industry, while FORentry measures the initial shock when foreign firms entered the industry the first time. However, if the production efficiency of domestic entrants improves over time, which is likely, then DOMentry is a proper analog to FORentry dummy. Both DOMentry and DOMgrowth were constructed before data cleaning to get the best coverage of the industry. All specifications include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text for details). Standard errors in parentheses. In the log-normal model, the exponentiated coefficients and standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters) calculated by the Delta method reported. *Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the industry growth rate is included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details). For presentation purposes, the coefficients (and standard errors) denoted by "b" are divided by 1,000. not reliably calculate DOMgrowth for all industry years in my exit sample. So when controlling for DOMgrowth, the sample is the same as when estimating the growth equation. 47 Table 5 shows the results from the tobit and log-normal models when gradually adding these controls. Including any of these variables does not change my previous findings. In particular, the estimated impacts of foreign firms in table 5 are basically the same as those estimated in table 4 (columns 5 and 7). 48 In both tables, tobit results show FORgrowth = 0.01 being significant and FORentry insignificant. In survival, 47 Gaps in sales can create huge jumps in domestic output and thus growth rates, especially when aggregating across a small number of firms. To avoid this mismeasurement I took all the observations (before data cleaning) with nonmissing firm growth rates and calculated DOMgrowth as the sum of other domestic firm growth rates weighted by their shares in the total threedigit domestic production at time t. When I calculated DOMgrowth within two-digit industry, the results were the same as the ones I report. 48 The results do not change if in the survival, I exclude overall industry growth rate as a control. FORgrowth = 1.233 in table 4 (column 7), while the estimates in table 5 are about the same: 1.228, 1.217, and 1.213, despite the smaller sample size. Similarly, when comparing the effect of FORentry, log-normal estimates in both tables are around 0.2, implying a reduction in domestic firm survival by 80%. Such similarities hold also in the unreported regressions when I split the coefficients of foreign and other domestic firms across classified and nonclassified domestic firms.
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Moreover, the growth of other domestic firms, DOMgrowth, has an insignificant impact on both growth rate and survival of a focal domestic firm. DOMentry shows a significant impact only on survival, but unlike foreign entry, other domestic entrants represent a much weaker threat, reducing firm survival by about 25% according to the estimates in table 5. 49 However, even this effect goes away when I divide the industries into those with high versus low FDI stock (see below). So the impact of foreign firms is different from other domestic firms, supporting the discussion in section IIA. 50 It might be that domestic and foreign dynamics work differently across industries with and without foreign presence and my results are actually driven by eleven industries without foreign firms (the industries that only domestic firms enter). So in unreported regressions, I drop these eleven industries. The results confirm all my previous findings and reject such an explanation.
B. Industries with Foreign Firms: High versus Low FDI Stock
I further divide 130 industries with foreign firms into those with high versus low FDI stock. The first subsample includes industries that primarily foreign firms enter, while the latter includes industries that both domestic and foreign firms enter. If my results reflect FDI impact rather than the impact of some other unobserved factors, one would expect stronger effects in industries with high FDI stock.
The Czech National Bank (2003) The results in table 6 again confirm my findings of static but no dynamic crowding-out effect, and both FORgrowth and FORentry show stronger impacts in high-than in low-FDI industries. FORgrowth (larger by 1 standard deviation) raises domestic firm growth rates by around 1.7% in high-FDI industries but is insignificant in low-FDI industries, and it raises firm survival by 43% in high-versus 35% in low-FDI industries. The same is true for FORentry effect. Interestingly also, FORempl.sh shows a much higher importance of technology spillovers on domestic firm survival in low-FDI industries. And, DOMentry shows and insignificant impact (at the 5% level) on both growth and survival. All specifications include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text for details). Standard errors in parentheses. In the log-normal model, the exponentiated coefficients and standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters) calculated by the Delta method reported. *Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the industry growth rate was included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details).
Overall, this section confirms the robustness of my original specification and all the findings and provides compelling evidence that the impact of foreign firms is different from other domestic firms. In particular, although there are long-run benefits from foreign firms-positive externalities offset the negative shakeout effect due to initial foreign entry within two years (see section VII)-there are no such benefits from other domestic firms. At a macrolevel, Borensztein et al. (1998) also find that across 69 developing countries, FDI contributes to overall growth much more than domestic investment does. Below I use my original empirical specification, as it also allows me to use my full sample, and explore the alternative hypotheses that could explain positive FORgrowth and dynamic crowding-in effect. Blomström et al. (2000) , Keller (2004) , and Aghion et al. (2009) suggest that we should see the crowding-out effect 876 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS All specifications include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text for details). Standard errors in parentheses. In the log-normal model, the exponentiated coefficients and standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters) calculated by the Delta method reported. *Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the industry growth rate is included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details). For presentation purposes, the coefficients (and standard errors) denoted by "b" are divided by 1,000. mostly in industries where domestic firms are technologically behind foreign firms. Similarly, studies on technology spillovers often find positive spillovers only in high-tech industries. 51 To assess how technological differences affect my results, I divide industries into technology leaders and laggards. Technology leaders are industries in which the technology difference between domestic and foreign firms (mean of gap variable without absolute value) is greater than or equal to zero. Technology laggards are industries with technology difference less than zero. Among 130 industries with foreign presence in my sample, 83 are defined as technology leaders and 47 as laggards. Table 7 shows the results from the tobit and log-normal models. They confirm my previous findings of no dynamic, but the presence of the static crowding out effect. While FORentry raises the exit hazard in both groups by around 80% (the same as in the overall sample), FORgrowth larger by 1 standard deviation raises firm survival by 35% for leaders and 41% for laggards. Moreover, FORgrowth increases domestic firm growth rates by a similar magnitude as in the aggregate sample (0.01) for technology leaders, but it has on insignificant impact for laggards. Similarly, foreign employment share (larger by 1 standard deviation) raises firm growth by 5% and survival by 21%, but again only for technology leaders. These results support the arguments in the literature that intraindustry technology spillovers are more likely to appear in the technologically advanced industries. However, I do not find any evidence for intrafirm technology spillovers (FORdirect is always insignificant). All specifications include firm-level means to model firm unobserved correlated heterogeneity (see text for details). Standard errors in parentheses. In the log-normal model, the exponentiated coefficients and standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clusters) calculated by the Delta method reported. *Significant at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1%. All regressions include constant, industry, year, and regional dummies. The growth regressions also include industry-trend cross effects (in the survival model, the industry growth rate was included instead) and four exit-type dummies (see text for details). NoForeign dummy is dropped in low-export industries, since they all have foreign presence. 
C. Technology Leaders versus Technology Laggards
D. Export Spillovers versus Demand Creation Effect?
Alternatively, the positive foreign growth effect can represent export spillovers 52 or domestic demand creation within three-digit industries. 53 MNCs can increase demand for local inputs or initiate demand for new goods and services not produced by the local firms before (for example, consulting and various other business services occurred in the Czech Republic only with the arrival of MNCs). Moreover, MNCs may bring higher-quality or previously unavailable inputs and thus enhance the production of local firms. Under both hypotheses-export spillovers or demand creation-larger foreign sales should increase the growth rates and survival of domestic firms. As table 11 shows, more domestic firms 52 Blomström et al. (2000) discuss that MNCs may help local firms enter the export markets by, for example, creating the transport infrastructure, disseminating information about foreign markets, or providing inputs unavailable in the local markets and thus facilitating the links between local firms and foreign buyers.
53 Three-digit USSICs often contain four-digit industries linked in the production process. For example, USSIC = 371 includes 3711 (motor vehicles and passenger car bodies manufacturing) as well as 3714 (motor vehicle parts and accessories manufacturing). However, there are no fourdigit input-output tables available to explore detailed links. enter than exit during my sample period. 54 This is possible only if firms see more business opportunities on domestic or export market. However, if the positive foreign growth effect represents export spillovers, it should be observed only among export-intensive domestic firms. Since Amadeus does not provide firm-level exports, I test this by dividing 141 industries into high-and low-export-oriented.
I take 1996-2000 exports at the two-digit CPA industry classification (Classification of Products by Activity) from the Czech Statistical Office. 55 I define the 23 (out of 33) twodigit industries with an average export share at least 1% as high-export sectors. 56 Using the cross-reference tables from Amadeus between UKSIC (same as CPA) codes and USSIC codes, I translated these two-digit sectors into the three-digit USSIC codes. The 72 matching industries (out of 141) in 54 For evidence on FDI impact on domestic entry rates, see Ayyagari and Kosová (2010) . 55 Unfortunately, the Statistical Office does not report exports at USSIC codes. The data for 1994-1995 are unavailable, since there were numerous changes in the trade statistics and industry classifications due to EU enlargement that the Statistical Office did not incorporate into the data calculations before 1996.
56 Among these, two sectors had an export share larger than 10%, and five sectors had a share between 5%-10%. Table 8 shows that while foreign growth rate (larger by 1 standard deviation) raises domestic firm survival in all industries, it significantly raises growth rates by 1.8% only among low-export firms. Since high-export firms have established customers abroad, the local links with MNCs are not so crucial for their growth as for the other domestic firms. So I propose that the positive foreign growth effect that I find represents domestic demand creation (via customer and supplier links among domestic and foreign firms within three-digit industries), not export market spillovers. Similarly, the static crowding out affects all firms, but its impact on survival is weaker (57%) in high-export than in low-export (83%) industries. This again can be justified by the fact that high-export firms have customers abroad, so higher competition due to foreign entry represents a smaller threat.
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IX. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of foreign presence on the growth and survival of domestic firms, using 1994-2001 firmlevel panel data for the Czech Republic. I separate the two opposing effects of foreign presence-a negative crowding out and positive technology spillovers-and analyze whether the crowding-out effect is dynamic, that is, domestic firms cut production over time as foreign firms grow in the domestic industry, or a static effect, realized on foreign entry. Theoretically I rely on a model that combines a dominant NA  1994  805  81  157  20  1995  541  0  118  0  1996  471  0  74  0  1997  382  1  46  0  1998  275  78  30  8  1999  169  77  22  5  2000  51  36  3  4  2001  0  0  0  2  Year unknown  0  0  37  0  Total firms  6,291  273  1207  39 Reported numbers include firms with with nonmissing sales.
DO FOREIGN FIRMS CROWD OUT DOMESTIC FIRMS?
879 firm-competitive fringe framework and a model on firm and industry dynamics by Jovanovic (1982) and Sun (2002) . If crowding out is a dynamic effect, the foreign growth rate should have a negative impact on both the growth and survival of domestic firms. If it is a static effect only foreign entry should have a negative effect on domestic firm growth and survival. I estimate random and fixed effects, GEE, and tobit models to analyze domestic firm growth rates and Cox, log-normal, and probit models to analyze firm survival. All estimations control for endogeneity due to firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. My results show evidence of both technology spillovers and a crowding-out effect. However, crowding out appears to be a short-term or static phenomenon: initial foreign entry increases the exit rates of domestic firms. Subsequently, however, the foreign sales growth increases both the growth rate and the survival of domestic firms. Dividing industries between low-and high-export oriented suggests that this positive foreign growth effect represents domestic demand creation rather than export spillovers. My results indicate a shakeout of domestic firms due to foreign entry, but afterward, domestic firms benefit from foreign presence. This is consistent with the conclusion by Aitken and Harrison (1999) that a negative competitive effect should be temporary, and positive FDI spillovers should dominate in the long run. In my data, the estimates suggest that positive externalities due to demand creation and technology spillovers offset the initial crowding-out effect caused by foreign entry into the industry within two years.
These results are robust across different specifications. Additional analyses also reject the possibility that benefits from FDI are captured by the joint ventures or that my findings are picking up general entry or a growth effect common to foreign and domestic firms. Including controls for the entry and growth of other domestic firms and dividing industries into those with high versus low FDI stock confirm my findings and provide convincing evidence that the impact of foreign firms is indeed different from that of domestic firms. Although there are long-run benefits from foreign competition, there are no such benefits from other domestic firms. Further analyses also show that domestic firms in the technologically advanced industries are the ones that benefit from technology spillovers. This supports arguments that domestic firms must be technologically advanced in order to benefit from technology spillovers.
From a policy perspective, my paper shows that FDI generates positive benefits for domestic firms, so countries should remove, not install, restrictions against FDI. The results also provide justification for transitional countries' granting investment incentives to MNCs.
A related issue, beyond the scope of this paper, however, is whether the FDI impact varies with the country of origin. Using a smaller sample, where I could identify at least the region of the ultimate owner, I find that the strongest technology spillovers generate the MNCs from Anglo-Saxon countries (United States, Canada and United Kingdom), while the MNCs from western Europe drive the demand creation effect. 57 Due to the lack of exact data on the origin of MNCs, these results are suggestive, but they indicate that FDI origin may affect the type and magnitude of FDI spillovers. Thus, governments should be careful when and what type of FDI incentives to offer. I leave the detailed analyses of these issues for future work. 57 See Kosová (2004) for more details.
